Countries, scenarios and costs: the calculator
Try it yourself: a calculator for countries, emission targets, warming and costs, below it the cost studies for Austria, Germany and the European Union.
How to read: Measurement measured values · Reconstruction from indirect data such as ice or tree rings · Model computer model · Own calculation calculated by me from raw data. Technical terms are explained in the glossary.
What changes if a country reduces its CO₂ emissions?
What the calculator represents: It calculates only with CO₂ from fossil sources and industry (according to data of the Global Carbon Project, production-based), excluding land-use change, methane, nitrous oxide and sinks. The political targets (Austria: climate neutrality 2040; EU: 90% less net greenhouse gas emissions by 2040 compared with 1990) apply to all greenhouse gases net; here they are transferred, in simplified form, as a target path to the CO₂ series. The question is therefore more precisely: what does a reduction of fossil CO₂ emissions along a simplified target path achieve? A full greenhouse gas module (fossil CO₂, land use, methane and other gases, net emissions with sinks) is not included. The single targets “EU 2030” and “EU 2040” stay at the level reached after the target year; climate neutrality in 2050 is only contained in the path “EU path: −55% by 2030, −90% by 2040, zero by 2050”.
💬 In plain language
- Here you can try out what changes when a country emits less CO₂.
- The calculator uses an assumption from climate science: 1,000 billion tonnes more CO₂ make the Earth about 0.45 degrees warmer. This is an assumption, not a measured value.
- Austria emits about 0.14 out of 100 parts of the world’s CO₂. If Austria saves a great deal, the warmth of the whole Earth changes by only tiny thousandths of a degree. This is because the air is distributed around the whole Earth. What counts is what all countries emit together.
- To try it out: select all countries (“All”) and set the slider to −30%. You then see what happens if all countries together save 30% (about 0.4 degrees less by 2100). This is not realistic, however: China, the USA and India together emit more than half of the world’s CO₂. China and India have their own climate targets under the Paris Agreement, and the USA has no longer been part of it since January 2026. According to assessments, however, the commitments so far and the actual development of emissions are not enough for a joint reduction of 30%.
- “Zero” means: immediately no more coal, oil or gas. There would then be no petrol cars, no oil heating and no aeroplanes as we know them today. That is why this is only a thought experiment.
- The costs are a rough estimate. The first steps are fairly cheap, the last very expensive. The curve below shows this.
Additional effect instead of overall forecast: Shown is the estimated additional temperature effect of the chosen reduction compared with constant emissions of the selection, not a forecast of global temperature development. The basis is the avoided cumulative CO₂ emissions, the IPCC relationship (TCRE, about 0.45 °C per 1,000 billion t CO₂) and the simplified assumption that 39% stays in the air. The model curve is only for orientation and is not subtracted. The actual effect depends, among other things, on the future development of the carbon cycle. “Avoided additional warming” means: the temperature does not fall because of it, it only rises less strongly.
On the assumption behind this calculation: All values assume that CO₂ acts as the IPCC states, namely 0.45 °C per 1,000 billion t of CO₂ (likely range 0.27 to 0.63). This is the calculation assumption of this page; it does not assess the effect itself. The assessment has changed over the years: older presentations often assumed very high emission scenarios, and some climate models warm more than the measurements. Both are weighted less in the latest IPCC report, so the expected warming by 2100 is lower than before.
Cost and effect: The calculation shows the order of magnitude of what is being done in Austria, Germany and the EU. One example is the EU path: by this estimate it costs about 1,650 to 3,300 billion € in total by 2050 and avoids about 0.017 °C of additional warming (range 0.010 to 0.024 °C). No calculation by official bodies of how many degrees the EU or Austria alone would achieve was found. Besides temperature, the EU names further reasons for its policy, such as less dependence on energy imports and cleaner air; these can be considered independently of the temperature figure.
Economy: For energy-intensive companies in the EU, electricity is, according to the International Energy Agency, more than twice as expensive as in the USA and about 50% more expensive than in China. No reliable figures were found on whether industry moves abroad as a result.
Role-model effect (reports and polls): The EU aims to be a role model for other countries. According to media reports, India, China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa jointly rejected the EU's carbon border levy (CBAM) in August 2026 as unilateral, punitive and protectionist. In 2025, China commissioned as many new coal power plants as in no year for a decade (about 78 gigawatts, although they run at only about half capacity there). Polls see the EU as mostly positive overall (Pew 2025: a median of 62% in 25 countries), but that does not concern its climate course. The evidence is further down under Links.
How is this calculated, and what does it not show?
Assumption: Without additional reduction, the emissions of the selected country stay at the 2025 level (“business as usual”, reference path). The calculator compares this reference path with the chosen reduction path; the saved amount is the difference. On the target paths (EU, Austria), emissions fall linearly from 2025 to the respective target year and then stay at the level reached; only with a target of 100% (climate neutrality) are they zero afterwards. With “Choose freely”, the percentage set applies immediately from 2026 and unchanged up to the chosen year (a step, not a gradual path); only at 100% are emissions zero from 2026 on.
From the amount, the temperature effect follows linearly via the IPCC’s cumulative relationship (TCRE): 0.45 °C per 1,000 billion t CO₂ (likely range 0.27 to 0.63, AR6). The effect on the CO₂ content of the air assumes the measured retention of 39% in the air (see “Amount & origin”; a simplifying assumption, because the actual uptake by land and ocean changes with climate and emissions) and uses 7.78 billion t CO₂ per ppm.
How are the abatement costs estimated? These are modelled direct abatement costs for an orderly conversion with replacement technology, not taxes and not the costs of an immediate stop without replacement. The calculation uses a simplified, self-defined marginal cost curve. It represents the assumption that the first steps of emission reduction are comparatively cheap and that costs increase at higher degrees of reduction.
| Reduction | Lower assumption (€ per tonne CO₂) | Upper assumption (€ per tonne CO₂) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 % | 0 | 0 |
| 25 % | 10 | 20 |
| 50 % | 50 | 100 |
| 75 % | 100 | 200 |
| 100 % | 200 | 400 |
Between these points the marginal costs are interpolated linearly; the average cost per tonne follows from the mean of the marginal cost curve up to the respective degree of reduction. The support points are own model assumptions, not values taken directly from the IPCC. The IPCC (AR6, Working Group III) describes a considerable worldwide potential of low-cost measures: measures up to about 20 US dollars per tonne of CO₂ make up more than half of the potential, and with measures up to about 100 US dollars per tonne roughly half of the emissions from 2019 to 2030 could be avoided worldwide. That is the background for the order of magnitude and the rise of costs, but not a national marginal cost curve and not a derivation of the support points. From 50% reduction the values are an extrapolation; the IPCC points out that marginal costs can rise steeply at high reductions, so the upper assumption (400 € per tonne at 100%) is not a secure upper limit. The lower and upper curves are two illustrative cost scenarios, not statistical confidence intervals and not a forecast of the actual costs in Austria, Germany or the EU.
Not taken into account: The costs depend only on the degree of reduction, not on the year (no technological learning curves, no inflation, no financing costs); the costs of all years are simply added up without discounting; distributional effects, monetised climate damage and additional economic benefits such as lower energy imports or cleaner air are not included.
Comparison with investment studies (a different quantity): For Austria the Umweltbundesamt (Environment Agency Austria) cites additional investment of 6.4 to 11.2 bn € per year for climate neutrality by 2040 (1.1 to 1.9% of GDP). That is an investment need and not abatement costs: investments create assets and can reduce running energy and operating costs. The range calculated here for 100% (about 3.6 to 7.2 bn € per year) measures something different; the two figures stand side by side but do not confirm each other. For comparison of prices: the price in EU emissions trading was mostly 70 to 90 € per tonne in 2026.
On the value “per avoided thousandth of a °C”: It results solely from the price per tonne and the IPCC relationship (0.45 °C per 1,000 billion t CO₂). It is therefore the same for every country and hardly changes with the time horizon; it only rises when the reduction gets deeper, because the average cost per tonne rises. It states what a thousandth of a degree of avoided additional warming costs under this calculation assumption, and is thus more a conversion of the assumption than a finding in its own right. Different costs of different countries are not included in the calculation.
Not included: land use (deforestation), methane and other gases, relocation of production to other countries, feedbacks and the behaviour of other countries. These are production-based figures (what is emitted within the country itself), not consumption-based ones. “EU-27” includes its member states; if both are selected, the members are counted only once. The result is an order of magnitude and not a prediction. Sources: Our World in Data (Global Carbon Project), IPCC AR6.
The formulas behind it
The page does all calculations in the browser, using the figures from two small files (emissions by country, temperature series). They are simple, linear calculations; here step by step (E = emissions, r = reduction relative to 2025, H = selected year).
1 · Reduction path. On the target paths (EU, Austria), the reduction falls linearly from 0 in 2025 to the target value in the target year and then stays constant; with “Choose freely”, the set value R applies immediately from 2026 (r(y) = R for all years y > 2025 up to H). The EU targets are relative to 1990, so they are converted to the 2025 level of the selection (E₁₉₉₀ and E₂₀₂₅ are the CO₂ emissions of the selection in those years):
2 · Amount saved (sum over the years, in billion t CO₂ after converting from Mt):
3 · Temperature and CO₂ concentration. The factor 0.45 °C per 1,000 billion t is the IPCC relationship between emitted CO₂ and warming (TCRE, range 0.27 to 0.63). 39% of the CO₂ remains in the air; 7.78 billion t CO₂ correspond to 1 ppm:
4 · Costs. m(x) is the marginal cost in € per tonne at a reduction of x%. It rises linearly between the anchor points 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% from 0, 10, 50, 100 and 200 € (lower estimate) or 0, 20, 100, 200 and 400 € (upper estimate) respectively. The average over the reduction gives the cost per tonne; multiplied by tonnes it gives the cost per year, and the sum gives the cost up to H:
5 · Price per thousandth of a degree. The effect ΔT(t) grows year by year; it is shown on its own and not subtracted from the model-mean curve (SSP2-4.5), because SSP2-4.5 already contains its own assumptions about falling emissions of all countries, whereas the saving here is calculated against constant emissions of the country:
Not included are methane and other gases, land use, feedbacks, relocation of production and the behaviour of other countries. It is an order of magnitude, not a prediction.
What do studies say about the costs of the 2040 climate target in Austria?
Nothing here is calculated by ourselves; it shows what published studies report for the scenario “climate neutrality 2040” (KN40), each compared with the scenario WEM (“with existing measures”, as of 1 January 2022). Price basis 2024 and period 2024 to 2040 unless stated otherwise. Every figure carries a quality grade: A directly from the study, B derived by us from study values, C approximation (none in this module). What the studies do not report is shown as a gap.
1 · Investment: total and additional
| Sector (bars: total above, additional below; lighter = upper estimate) | Total 2024–2040, bn € A | Additional 2024–2040, bn € A | Additional per year, avg. bn € |
|---|---|---|---|
| Industry | 16 to 28 | 8.6 to 15.4 | 0.5 to 1 B |
| Energy | 155.9 to 174.5 | 38.5 to 83 | 2.4 to 5.2 B |
| Transport | 273 to 391.8 | 45.1 to 65.3 | 2.8 to 4.1 B |
| Buildings | 303.8 to 438.3 | 10.3 to 15 | 0.6 to 0.9 B |
| Total | 748.7 to 1,032.6 | 102.5 to 178.7 | 6.4 to 11.2 B |
Additional investments are the total investments minus replacement investments and the investments already contained in the WEM scenario. The additional amount per year is the sum divided by 16 years (this is how the study’s annual values come about; grade B). Transport and buildings have high total but low additional amounts: for electric vehicles price parity with combustion vehicles is assumed between 2028 (cars) and 2032 (heavy trucks), and higher renovation investment is partly offset by lower new-build investment. About one third of the additional investment is private (2.0 to 3.7 bn € per year), about two thirds public (4.4 to 7.5 bn €).
2 · Over time: additional investment by period
The study reports the additional investment by period (2024–2030, 2031–2040, 2041–2050), not as individual annual values. Shown is the average per year: the period total divided by 7, 10 and 10 years respectively (B). The lower estimate is on the left, the upper estimate of the study on the right. The period 2041–2050 lies after the target year 2040 (shown paler).
All sectors together, the additional investment averages 4.9 to 8.8 bn € per year (2024–2030), 6.9 to 11.7 bn € (2031–2040) and 1.2 to 1.9 bn € (2041–2050) B. The largest effort therefore falls in the decade before the target year. In the buildings sector the additional investment is negative in 2041–2050 (lower investment, −18 to −30 bn €), because KN40 needs less new construction than WEM. The study does not publish individual years for investment; that is a gap.
Sub-areas and table of the periods (additional investment, bn €, lower to upper estimate)
| Area | 2024–2030 | 2031–2040 | 2041–2050 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | 12.4 to 30.1 | 26.1 to 53.1 | 6 to 7.4 |
| Renewables expansion | 0 to 16.3 | 0 to 20.1 | 0 to 0 |
| Power grid | 9.9 to 10.7 | 18.8 to 23.7 | 3.1 to 3.8 |
| H₂ grid | 2.5 to 3.1 | 5 to 6.3 | 2.5 to 3.1 |
| CO₂ network | 0 to 0 | 2.3 to 3 | 0.4 to 0.5 |
| Industry | 3 to 6.3 | 5.7 to 9.2 | 0.3 to 1.6 |
| Iron/steel | 0 to 0.5 | 1.9 to 3.1 | 0 to 0.1 |
| Stone and earth | 0.4 to 0.9 | 1.5 to 1.9 | 0 to 0.4 |
| Paper & pulp | 0.4 to 0.5 | 0.3 to 0.6 | 0 to 0.1 |
| Chemical industry | 0.3 to 1 | 0.1 to 0.8 | 0 to 0.4 |
| Ammonia/fertiliser | 0.1 to 0.3 | 0.1 to 0.3 | 0 to 0 |
| Other sectors & cross-cutting | 1.8 to 3.1 | 1.8 to 2.5 | 0.3 to 0.6 |
| Transport | 16.2 to 21.9 | 29 to 43.4 | 23.9 to 40 |
| Public transport | 6.3 to 8.5 | 19.6 to 29.2 | 25.7 to 42.9 |
| Fleet electrification | 7.8 to 10.5 | 7.8 to 11.8 | -1,9 to -3,2 |
| Active mobility | 2.1 to 2.9 | 1.6 to 2.4 | 0.1 to 0.3 |
| Buildings | 2.5 to 3.4 | 7.8 to 11.6 | -18 to -30 |
| Residential buildings | 1.6 to 2.1 | 3.4 to 5 | -17 to -28,2 |
| Service buildings | 0.9 to 1.3 | 4.4 to 6.6 | -1 to -1,8 |
Table 68 (transport) is labelled “2024–2030” in the study but contains the values for 2031–2040; the sums of Table 67 + 68 agree with Table B/23 (121.4+151.8 ≈ 273.0 total; 16.2+29.0 ≈ 45.1 additional). The energy tables 51–53 are labelled “euro 2020” in the study, the others “euro 2024”; the sums 2024–2040 (Tables 49+50) agree with Table B, so the 2020 label is probably a typing error in the study. Rounding differences: the sum of the periods 2024–2030 and 2031–2040 differs from Table B by at most 0.3 bn € (industry, total lower 16.3 instead of 16.0; energy additional upper 83.2 instead of 83.0). For 2041–2050 the additional investment in buildings is negative (lower investment, −18 to −30 bn €), because KN40 needs less new construction than WEM; this period lies after the target year 2040. A
3 · Macroeconomic effect (MIO-ES model of the Umweltbundesamt)
MIO-ES combines an economic model with the energy system. According to the Umweltbundesamt it provides no point-precise forecasts but shows how measures affect the economy compared with a base scenario; the results depend on the model assumptions. The price basis of these percentages is not stated on the website.
4 · Counter-findings and caveats from the same study
- Competitiveness: In a scenario in which energy unit costs rise in the EU and half as strongly outside it, the exports of manufacturing are on average 1.5% (2030), 3.6% (2040) and 4.9% (2050) below the base scenario. In energy-intensive sectors the decline in 2040 is larger: paper 4.7%, chemical products 9.6%, other non-metallic products 6.2%, metal production and processing 4.2%. According to these results de-industrialisation is not to be feared, but individual sectors come under greater pressure. The study stresses that this export model is not a forecast over almost 30 years and only shows differences between scenarios.
- Distribution: Up to 2030 the disposable income of the lowest fifth is about 2% above WEM; from 2031 to 2040 the fourth and fifth quintile benefit somewhat disproportionately; from 2041 to 2050 there are slightly negative distributional effects, for which social transfers to the lower three quintiles are built into the scenario.
- Financing: The funds are considered available in the economy as a whole. The study does, however, point to little fiscal room for higher government investment (the state would have to invest about 0.3 to 0.5% of GDP more) and possible liquidity problems for low-income households and small businesses.
- Compensation of residual emissions: Remaining greenhouse gas emissions in KN40 of about 11 million t (2040) must be compensated (forests, moors, CCS/BECCS/DACCS). The study estimates the annual cost of this at roughly 3 to 10 bn € (electricity 0.8–2.3; heat 1.6–5.5 bn €; excluding transport and storage); it did not consider a financial estimate within the scenario itself sensible, and the effort is not contained in Table B. A
- Not included: For agriculture there is no transition scenario and therefore no investment costs. The compensation of remaining emissions (for example through land use or CO₂ capture) was not estimated financially.
5 · Running costs: examples only, no total
| Area | Result of the study’s example calculation |
|---|---|
| Buildings | Energy costs in the building stock fall by 22% (70 m² flat) and 37% (service building of 700 m²) from 2030 to 2050; the share of renovated residential buildings rises from 11% to 53%. |
| Transport | The average annual costs of an electric car are 57% below those of a combustion car in 2030 and 72% below in 2050 (assumption). Heavy electric trucks: −17% (2030) and −39% (2050) energy costs; hydrogen trucks: +36% (2030), −36% (2050). |
| Industry | Energy costs mostly rise in energy-intensive sectors. Example iron and steel: energy costs +47%, production costs +28% (switch to electric arc furnace and hydrogen reduction). Energy currently accounts for 12 to 25% of production costs. |
6 · Scenario assumptions (framework data over time)
| Scenario assumption | 2020 | 2030 | 2040 | 2050 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CO₂ price EU-ETS, KN40 (€/t CO₂) | 24 | 200 | 400 | 500 |
| CO₂ price non-ETS, KN40 (€/t CO₂) | – | 200 | 400 | 500 |
| CO₂ price EU-ETS, WEM (€/t CO₂) | 24 | 80 | 85 | 160 |
| International oil price (€/GJ) | 6 | 15 | 16 | 20 |
| International natural gas price (€/GJ) | 3,1 | 11,3 | 11,3 | 11,8 |
| Electricity households/transport, KN40 (€/GJ) | 47 | 58–64 | 65–71 | 65–71 |
| Electricity industry, KN40 (€/GJ) | 29 | 33–37 | 34–38 | 34–38 |
| Population (million) | 8,9 | 9,2 | 9,5 | 9,6 |
Price basis of this table: euro 2020. The CO₂ price is a model assumption here that steers behaviour in the scenario (KN40: 200 € per tonne in 2030, 400 € in 2040, 500 € in 2050; WEM: 80, 85 and 160 €); it is not a cost curve and not a cost value, and it is independent of the cost curve in the calculator above A. For comparison of the scenarios: in scenario KN40/50 (emissions trading sector reaches climate neutrality only by 2050) the additional investment 2024 to 2050 totals 103.1 to 178.8 bn € (total investment 956.3 to 1,369.9 bn €), i.e. about as much as in KN40 to 2040, but spread over a longer period A.
7 · What the studies do not provide
- Net system costs (investment plus running costs minus saved costs) for Austria as a whole: not published as a euro total. They cannot be derived from the examples above, so we show no figure here.
- Avoided climate damage: Deliberately not offset against the costs. There are separate studies on it (for example the COIN2.0 project), but they measure something different from the costs of the transformation.
How this relates to the calculator above
The calculator above uses a self-defined cost curve and gives illustrative abatement costs per tonne. The studies here measure different quantities: investment, not costs per tonne. The two sets of figures do not confirm each other and must not be offset against each other. The calculator shows the order of magnitude of a thought experiment, the studies the published state of modelling for Austria.
Sources (data as of 20 Nov 2026): Weyerstraß et al. (IHS), Gesamtwirtschaftlicher Investitionsbedarf in Österreich zur Erreichung der Klimaziele (macroeconomic investment need in Austria for reaching the climate targets), 2024 (Table B, pages iii to viii, Table 1 on page 4, pages 150 to 151, appendix tables 49 to 69); Umweltbundesamt, investment need for climate neutrality 2040; Umweltbundesamt, macroeconomic effects of climate neutrality 2040 (MIO-ES). Wrong values? Please report.
What does the KfW study say about the investment needed for climate neutrality by 2045?
Nothing here is calculated by ourselves; it shows what the study by Prognos commissioned by KfW reports (KfW Research, Fokus Volkswirtschaft No. 561, 12 October 2026): four transformation scenarios for climate neutrality in 2045, period 2025 to 2045, prices of 2024. The quality grades apply as in the Austria section: A directly from the study, B derived by us, C approximation (none here). The paper itself notes that it reflects the opinion of the authors and not necessarily the position of KfW.
1 · Three investment concepts that must not be confused
| Concept | Meaning in the study |
|---|---|
| Climate protection investment | Total investment in “green” technologies, for example the whole heat pump or the whole electric car; excluding natural and human capital and excluding climate adaptation. |
| Net investment | Extra cost compared with a fossil reference technology, for example a heat pump compared with a gas condensing boiler. Replacement investment occurs only after the end of service life (no early shutdowns). |
| Total investment | All gross fixed capital formation of a sector (physical assets and intellectual property); about 31% of it is climate protection investment. |
This is not the same as the “additional investment” in the Austrian study: there the comparison is the scenario WEM with existing measures (excluding replacement investment), here a fossil reference technology or the level of 2018 to 2023. The figures must therefore not be set against each other. A
2 · By sector and scenario
| Scenario | Energie | Verkehr | Gebäude | Industrie | Total, trillion € |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KNDE | 1.64 | 2.87 | 1.31 | 0.54 | 6.36 |
| Roadmap | 1.32 | 2.63 | 1.72 | 0.52 | 6.2 |
| LFS/O45 | 1.79 | 2.71 | 0.91 | 0.52 | 5.93 |
| Ariadne | 1.35 | 2.75 | 1.33 | 0.27 | 5.7 |
The scenarios are “Roadmap Energy Efficiency 2045” (Roadmap), “Climate-Neutral Germany 2045” (KNDE), “Long-term scenarios, variant O45-Strom” (LFS/O45) and the technology-mix scenario of the Ariadne project. They differ in the weighting of efficiency, electrification and hydrogen. According to the study the range of 5.7 to 6.4 trillion € must be read with care because of the lower end (Ariadne): there the efficiency investment in industry is not completely covered, and for Ariadne and LFS/O45 the new-build investment in buildings is missing; these were filled in from the other scenarios (fill-in values). For transport and energy the orders of magnitude of the scenarios agree very well, according to the study. Shares on average: transport 45% (2.6 to 2.8 trillion €), energy 25% (1.3 to 1.8 trillion €), buildings 22% (0.9 to 1.7 trillion €), industry 8% (roughly 300 to 500 bn €). The net share differs greatly: in transport only about 19% of the climate protection investment (the price gap between electric and combustion cars is shrinking), for residential and non-residential buildings over 80%, in industry about one third. A
3 · Who has to invest?
- Public sector: about 12% of the investment, on average 33 bn € per year (up to 2030 in total 203 to 257 bn €, 2031 to 2045 in total 465 to 547 bn €). Only just under 6 bn € per year of this has to be financed directly from budgets; the rest falls to public enterprises such as municipal utilities, grid operators and transport companies. A
- Companies: about 2.8 to 3.2 trillion € by 2045, i.e. 132 to 150 bn € per year or about 3.2% of GDP; according to the KfW survey companies recently invested about 80 bn € per year in climate protection (not directly comparable, as gross). A
4 · Benefits and limits according to the study
- Benefits: The study names several advantages but does not offset them against the investment. Quantified are fossil energy imports (recently about 81 bn € per year on average), possible compensation payments at EU level (according to current projections Germany exceeds its emission allocations for 2021 to 2030 by 255 million t CO₂ equivalents; depending on the price that would be 15 to 38 bn €) and a final energy consumption 26 to 35% lower by 2045. A
- Limits: Climate adaptation is not included. The study calculates investment, not operating costs, energy costs or climate damage. It does not report effects on economic output and employment; that is a gap. In transport, net investment could even become negative in the long term because of falling battery costs. The study does not publish a year-by-year series of investment, only averages over 2025 to 2045 (for the public sector additionally the split 2025 to 2030 versus 2031 to 2045: share 13% versus 11%). A
Sources (data as of 20 Nov 2026): KfW Research, Fokus Volkswirtschaft No. 561: Germany on the way to climate neutrality – about 6 trillion EUR to be invested (12 Oct 2026); KfW press release of 12 Oct 2026. The underlying study by Prognos is cited in the paper but was not available to us. Wrong values? Please report.
What does the European Commission’s impact assessment say about the 2040 climate target?
Nothing here is calculated by ourselves; it shows what the Commission reports in its impact assessment SWD(2024) 63 on the 2040 target, based on the official graph data (Annex 8, version 23 April 2024, models PRIMES and E-QUEST) and the executive summary SWD(2024) 64. The target variants compared are S1 (option 1, up to 80%), S2 (option 2, at least 85%, also the baseline: continuation of the existing framework) and S3 (option 3, at least 90%) as well as LIFE (a scenario with behavioural change on the demand side). Quality grades: A value directly from the data, B derived by us (also the units, see below), C approximation (none here).
1 · Investment need in the energy system
| Variant | Energy system excl. transport 2031–2040 | 2041–2050 | Transport 2031–2040 | 2041–2050 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | 548 | 735 | 676 | 639 |
| S2 | 624 | 666 | 670 | 644 |
| S3 | 694 | 601 | 662 | 636 |
| LIFE | 611 | 588 | 597 | 567 |
Values in bn € per year, each the average of the decade (sum of the sectors from the data file, grade B). Difference S3 compared with the baseline S2: in the energy system excluding transport +70 bn € per year in 2031–2040 and −65 bn € per year in 2041–2050, in transport −8 and −8 bn € per year. The target variant of at least 90% therefore requires more investment in the decade to 2040 and less afterwards, as the Commission’s summary states. These are differences between two future paths, not additional costs compared with today. Important caveats: the price basis of the values is not stated in the data file, and the units (bn € and share of GDP) are not given there either; they follow from the range of values (sum S3 2031–2040 ≈ 694 bn € ≙ 3.7% of GDP). The main report could not be retrieved automatically; its definition of “investment needs” (for example gross or additional) could not be checked. B
2 · Total energy system costs and economic output
| Total energy system costs, % of GDP B | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | 13.3 | 12.5 | 11.7 | 11.3 | 10.6 |
| S2 | 13.3 | 12.8 | 12.1 | 11.3 | 10.6 |
| S3 | 13.3 | 13 | 12.3 | 11.3 | 10.6 |
| LIFE | 13.3 | 13 | 12.3 | 11.3 | 10.5 |
Total energy system costs fall in all variants from about 13.3% of GDP (2030) to about 10.6% (2050); the differences between the variants are small (2040: 11.7 to 12.3%). The Commission states that the options show only very limited differences in total energy system costs, GDP and competitiveness (global export shares). In the E-QUEST model GDP under S3 in 2040 is 0.77 to 0.81% below S2 (depending on the assumption on the use of revenues: transfers, income tax or green subsidies) and returns to about the level of S2 by 2050; under S1 it is 0.25 to 0.36% above it in 2040. The unit (percent) is derived from the range of values (B).
3 · What else the Commission states
- Option 3 requires higher annual investment in 2031 to 2040 than options 1 and 2 and comparatively lower investment afterwards; hydrogen electrolysis, carbon capture and industrial carbon removal are rolled out earlier. The options differ mainly in the pace of the transition. A
- All options lead to clearly better air quality and health benefits; option 3 brings the greatest benefits in energy independence and protection against fossil fuel price shocks. The cost increase for households compared with the baseline is said to be small, with compensation and redistribution measures not included. A
- Demand-side measures (scenario LIFE: food, circularity, mobility) can lower the costs to society, the investment need in new technologies and environmental risks. A
4 · What is missing, and why the figures are not comparable with Austria and Germany
| Country / region | Quantity | Compared with | Period and price basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Additional investment: 6.4 to 11.2 bn € per year (1.1 to 1.9% of GDP) | Scenario WEM (existing measures), excluding replacement investment | 2024–2040, price basis 2024 |
| Germany | Additional to the status quo: avg 65 bn € per year (1.5% of GDP 2024); net investment compared with a fossil reference: avg 145 bn € | Investment level 2018–2023 or fossil reference technology | 2025–2045, prices of 2024 |
| EU | Difference between the target variants: S3 compared with S2 in the energy system excluding transport +70 bn € per year (2031–2040) | Option 2 (continuation of the existing framework) | 2031–2040, price basis not stated |
The three studies answer different questions with different reference points, periods and delimitations. That is why there is deliberately no common figure and no country comparison here. For the EU the sources we checked lack: an additional investment total compared with today, a euro value for net costs, the price basis and employment effects. The claim of an IMF model from 2026 (additional investment of about 1% of GDP) was not checked and has not been included. A
Sources (data as of 20 Nov 2026): European Commission, Supplementary information: data for the graphs presented in the impact assessment SWD(2024) 63 (Annex 8), version 23 April 2024 (figures 101, 103, 104, 110 and 112); Executive Summary SWD(2024) 64. Wrong values? Please report.
Data as of November 2026. The data series end in different years depending on the source (mostly 2024 or 2025); the end point is given in the source note under each chart, an overview is on “Data and methods”.
